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APRIL 1959

Vol. 57

No. 6

THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING*

Nathan P. Feinsinger t
arose between the company and the employees,
... negotiations were had, largely at the instance of the
representatives of the employees, . . . the negotiations resulted in a settlement of the dispute. Stated thus nakedly,
this would look like collective bargaining at its best. Yet
the company filed charges accusing the unions of refusing
to bargain collectively, the Board issued a complaint pursuant to the charges, and issued an order directing the unions
to cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively."1

A

DISPUTE

In these words, Judges Madden and Fahy, respectively the
first Chairman and the first General Counsel of the National
Labor Relations Board, speaking in 1958 as members of the
United States Court of Appeals, indicated their bewilderment
at the changes in the meaning of the duty "to bargain collectively"
which seemed to them to have occurred since the Board's report
on its first year of operations under the National Labor Relations
(Wagner) Act2 of 1935. That report stated: 3
"Section 8, subdivision (5), of the act provides that it
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer 'to refuse
to bargain collectively 1vith the representatives of his em• An address delivered at an institute on Collective Bargaining and the Law, The
University of Michigan Law School, July 31, 1958.-Ed.
tProfessor of Law, University of Wisconsin.-Ed.
1 Madden, J., U.S. Court of Claims, sitting as a member of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, speaking for the majority (Madden and Fahy) in International Union,
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211 at 214. This
case denied enforcement to Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957).
2 49 Stat. 453 (1935). For the early developments, see Smith, "The Evolution of the
'Duty To Bargain' Concept in American Law," 39 MICH. L. REv. 1065 (1941). For more
recent developments, see Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv.
1401 (1958).
3 NLRB, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936).
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ployees, subject to the provisions of section 9(a).' Section
9(a) of the act provides that:
" 'Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment... .'
"Collective bargaining is something more than the mere
meeting of an employer with the representatives of his employees; the essential thing is rather the serious intent to
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground.
. . . The Board has repeatedly asserted that good faith on the
part of the employer is an essential ingredient of collective
bargaining."
In the context of the Board's first report, the reason for the
bewilderment· of Judges Madden and Fahy is apparent. In the
case under consideration, a union, existing for the very purpose
of bargaining collectively, had been charged with a refusal to
bargain. In the same case, a party to a labor dispute, seeking to
negotiate an agreement settling the dispute, had been charged
with a refusal to bargain because it had used economic pressure,
not otherwise prohibited by the act, in aid of its bargaining position. Were these events, strange though they might have seemed
in 1935, a proper cause for judicial concern in 1958?

I.

LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935 adopted
collective bargaining as a national policy for the prevention and
settlement of labor disputes. The act was based on the theory
". . . that free opportunity for negotiation with accredited representatives of employees is likely to promote industrial peace and
may bring about the adjustments and agreements which the Act
in itself does not attempt to compel." 4 Acting on that theory,
Congress imposed on employers the duty "to bargain collectively."5 In the 1947 amendments to the act, 6 Congress undertook

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 at 45 (1937).
Section 8(5) of the original NLRA, note 2 supra, carried for-ward in §8(a)(5) of the
act as amended in 1947, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(5).
6 Labor-Management Relations [Taft-Hartley] Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C.
(1952) §151 et seq. (hereinafter cited LMRA).
4
5
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to define the duty7 and extended it to unions. 8 What did Congress
mean by "collective bargaining?" How closely have the decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board and the reviewing courts
conformed to that meaning? Do those decisions support the
Board's recent statement that " ... our duty under the Act is ...
to determine whether the obligation of good faith bargaining has
been met rather than to establish ideal bargaining conditions?" 9
In the view of the Supreme Court, Congress had in mind "the
philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor movement
in the United States."10 According to that philosophy, collective
bargaining is viewed as essentially a voluntary process from its
inception. By imposing a legal duty to bargain, Congress itself
departed, in a sense, from that basic philosophy. The "majority
rule," 11 by which statutory bargaining is confined to dealings
between an employer and a union representing a majority of his
employees, is a further departure. That rule, moreover, conflicts
with one of the stated objectives of the act itself, namely, "the stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries." 12 If a majority of the employees in a
part of an industry, for example, vote against union representation, a union which represents other employees in the industry
is effectively blocked from pursuing the stated objective. The
1947 amendments go even farther in regulating, to some extent,
both the subject matter13 and procedure14 of bargaining, and in

7 Section 8(d) provides that " . . . to ,bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. • . ." Emphasis added.
s Section 8(b)(3) of the amended act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents-"to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions of section
9(a)." The latter section-9(a)-is quoted in the text at note 3.
9 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., 118 NL.R.B. 1055 at 1061 (1957).
10 Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 at
346 (1944). Quoted with approval in NLRB v. American National Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395
at 408 (1952).
11 LMRA, §9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(a).
12 LMRA, §1, "Findings and Policies," 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §151.
13 For example, the employer and the union can no longer negotiate a "closed
shop" agreement. LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3).
14 For example, a union must give 60 days notice of its intent to terminate or modify
a contract. LMRA, §8(d)(l), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d)(l).
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limiting the economic weapons which a union may use in seeking
to establish collective bargaining or in attaining its customary
objectives thereafter.15
These departures from "the philosophy of bargaining as
worked out in the labor movement in the United States" represent a proper exercise of judgment on the part of Congress in
weighing the values of "free" collective bargaining against its
own notions of "sound" or "ideal" bargaining. Within the limits
thus established, the Board was soon called upon to administer
the 1935 act in a variety of situations, out of which it evolved
the basic test of "good faith" bargaining. Pre-1947 decisions applying this test were presumably approved by Congress as part of
the 1947 amendments in undertaking to define the duty to bargain
collectively and in adopting "good faith" as the keystone of that
definition.16

IL "Gooo FArra'"

BARGAINING

In endorsing collective bargaining as a national policy, Congress sought to eliminate certain sources of industrial unrest,
to remedy the inequality of bargaining power between employers
and individual employees, to increase mass purchasing power
through increased wage levels, and to eliminate competitive
advantages based on differentials in wage rates and working conditions within and between industries. 17 These objectives were to
be met by encouraging the growth of strong unions and by
requiring the employer "to bargain collectively."
The meaning of the duty "to bargain collectively" must be
related to these objectives. One source of industrial unrest was
employer interference with self-organization of employees and
refusal to meet with unions freely chosen by them as their representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining. A definition
of the duty to bargain which would require the employer to
adopt a "hands off" attitude and simply to meet with the union
to listen to its proposals would largely solve this problem. But
such a narrow definition would not remove another kind of

15 For example, the union cannot resort to a secondary boycott in some situations.
LMRA, §8(b)(4), 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(b)(4).
16 LMRA, §B(d), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d).
17 Note 12 supra.
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threat to industrial peace, namely, strikes, lockouts and other
forms of economic disturbance resulting from disagreements over
wages, hours or working conditions. Congress was concerned with
that problem also, and recognized that a broader definition of the
duty to bargain was required to solve it. Thus, Congress sought
to eliminate obstructions to commerce "by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining," that is, "practices
fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes
arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working
conditions."18 Obviously, if the employer were to be obliged
to follow such practices, a merely passive attitude at the bargaining table would not suffice. To discharge his duty in good faith,
he would have to approach the bargaining table with a sincere
desire to reach agreement on the issues in dispute and to make a
reasonable effort toward that end. A reasonable effort would
include a willingness to explain his objections to the union's
proposals, to make counterproposals, and in general to act like
one who meant to do business rather than merely to go through
the motions. Good faith bargaining, by any definition, would
require at least that much. 19
There is, of course, some risk of confusing what Congress
hoped that good faith bargaining would accomplish with what it
intended to require, by imposing the duty to bargain. If all the
stated objectives of the act were to be read into the duty to
bargain, it would follow that an employer would be required
to make concessions in order, for example, to raise the general
level of wages or to eliminate differentials in w.ages or working
conditions. From the very outset, however, the Board made it
clear that the duty to bargain did not require the making of concessions,20 and this position was expressly approved by Congress
in 1947 in adopting section S(d).21 The duty to make counterproposals, as contrasted with concessions, is still considered as an
element of good faith bargaining.22
lSibid.
employer must "make some reasonable effort in some direction to compose
his differences with the union, if §8(a)(5) is to be read as imposing any substantial obligation at all." NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., (1st Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 131 at 134-135,
cert. den. 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
20See Matter of The Sands Mfg. Co., I N.L,R.B. 546 (1936).
21 See note 7 supra.
22 See discussion in Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv.
1401 at 1421 (1958).
19 The
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III.

CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF

"Goon

FAITH"

BARGAINING-EVOLUTION OF THE PER SE RULE

Most of the cases coming before the Board on a section 8(5)
or 8(a)(5) charge have been, or could have been, decided by
applying a simple test of good faith, namely, whether the evidence
revealed a lack of sincere desire and reasonable effort to reach an
agreement, or, as sometimes stated, a desire to avoid coming
to agreement.23 Early in its history, however, the Board began
to find violations of the act in situations where that simple test
does not wholly explain the result. Such situations include refusal
to sign a written agreement, unilateral changes in wages or other
conditions of employment, and refusal to furnish information
relating to the statutory subjects of bargaining.
In H. ]. Heinz Co. v. NLRB,2 4 decided in 1941, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Board that an employer's refusal to sign
a writing embodying the results of negotiations constituted a
violation of section 8(5). Describing a signed agreement as "the
final step in the bargaining process," the court reasoned that
failure to recognize the role of the union in that step "impairs
the bargaining process" and "tends to frustrate the aim of . . .
industrial peace through collective bargaining."25
Collective bargaining implies acceptance of the role of the
union as a joint participant in the establishment of employment
standards. Participation is not complete if the union is excluded
from the ":final step" of confirming the agreement reached, in
the form of a signed agreement. This reasoning is sufficient to
support the Heinz decision. Moreover, as the court pointed out,
at the time Congress adopted section 8(5), it had before it decisions
issued under section 7(a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act
of 1933,26 supporting the requirement of a signed agreement,
which decisions Congress presumably meant to approve. Any
question on that specific point was settled when Congress adopted
such a requirement as part of section 8(d).27 The significance of
the Heinz case is that its language, whether or not necessary to
23 See NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., (1st Cir. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 131 at 134, cert.
den. 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
24 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
25 Id. at 523-526.
26 48 Stat. 198.
21 Note 7 supra.
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the decision, laid the foundation for the view that "good faith"
bargaining requires more than willingness to reach an agreement;
that it also condemns conduct, whether or not supported by preWagner Act practice, which the Board may reasonably find to
be in conflict with the basic objective of the act, namely, the
promotion of industrial peace.
The broad language of the Supreme Court in the Heinz case
presented the Board with a dilemma. Congress sought to prevent
industrial unrest but did not prohibit it. In evaluating a particular course of conduct, the Board was obliged to heed both
propositions. What kinds of conduct were to be prescribed by the
Board under the court's formula, other than conduct made illegal
by the act or clearly contrary to its expressed policy? Was the
Board itself to establish standards of "sound," "fair" or "ideal"
bargaining? If so, where was it to find those standards? Would
failure to meet those standards constitute a per se violation of
section 8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3), or create a prima facie case, subject
to rebuttal, or simply constitute evidence of bad faith to be
considered in the context of the employer's total conduct? To
what extent would such standards be subject to judicial review?

A. Unilateral Action-R. L. White v. NLRB 28
The representatives chosen by the employees are by law the
"exclusive" representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining.29 An employer's unilateral action, prior to an impasse
in negotiations, with regard to wages or other subjects of bargaining, without prior notice to or consultation with the union,
violates this principle. The practical objection to such action
is that it suggests to employees that there is no need for a union,
and at the very least weakens the union's bargaining position.
In White's Uvalde Mines, 80 the Board recently held that an
employer had violated the provisions of section 8(a)(l) 81 and
(5) by granting unilateral merit wage increases after certification
of a union and before negotiations had commenced, without notice

28

(5th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 564.

29 LMRA, §9(a), 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952)

§159(a). See text above at note 3.
117 N.L.R.B. 1128 (1957).
81 Section 8(a)(l) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7," which
include the right to self-organization and to bargain collectively.
80
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to or discussion with the union. Although there were findings
of other violations of those provisions as well, the Board found
that the unilateral action constituted an independent violation,
stating: "Such conduct not only tends to undermine the Union's
authority as the employees' exclusive collective-bargaining representative, but also reflects adversely on the Respondent's good
faith in the ensuing negotiations.'' 32 The Board stated further:
"Moreover, we find that, even if there were some economic
justification for the haste, this does not excuse the Respondent's
failure to perform its statutory duty owing to its employees'
certified representative."33
Perhaps a per se rule in such a situation is justified in the
interest of administrative convenience and as affording a certain
guide for the parties. After all, it does not take much time to
call some official of a union on the phone. The wisdom of going
beyond establishing a rebuttable presumption may, however, be
questioned. Suppose X, a steel fabricator or auto parts manufacturer who has always settled with the local union on the basis of
the "pattern" of wage increases established by the steel producing
or auto manufacturing industry and their unions, has reached
agreement with the local on all issues but wages. The local has
not yet agreed to settle for the pattern but all indications are
that it will do so, although the question of retroactivity may
present a problem. The labor market is tight, and some of the
key employees of X are irked at his delay in granting a wage
increase, with retroactivity still uncertain. On the day of the
steel or auto wage settlement, X can find no authorized union
official to notify of his intent to place the same wage increase into
effect, with full retroactivity. Such a case illustrates the difficulty
with a per se rule in this area, and perhaps in any area of
bargaining.
In R. L. White v. NLRB 34 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed the Board's holding as to the unilateral merit
increases, rejecting the Board's per se rule, and upholding the
granting of the increases on the ground that they "were simply
in line with ... custom and practice" of the employer. The court's
reasoning on the latter point is questionable. Once a union is
32117 NL.R.B. 1128 at 1129 (1957). Emphasis added.
33 Id. at 1129, n. 6.
34 (5th Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 564.
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certified, continuing a past practice of individual bargaining
undermines its status as exclusive bargaining representative. The
suggestion of the court of appeals that an employer may continue
such a practice until negotiations begin, despite prior certification
of the union, appears to have no foundation in law.35
The White case involves another aspect of unilateral action and
its relation to the duty to bargain, which has considerable practical
significance. The problem stems from NLRB v. American
National Insurance Co.,36 holding that the extent to which a
contract should fix standards of employment is "a condition of
employment to be settled by bargaining." 37 In the latter case,
the employer refused to agree to any settlement which did not
include a "management prerogative" clause reserving unilateral
control over promotions, discipline and work schedules. The
union was willing to accept the clause provided that grievances
questioning the fairness of the employer's actions in the exercise
of his reserved rights could be taken to arbitration. The employer
rejected the arbitration proposal. During negotiations, the employer made unilateral changes in certain employment conditions included in the proposed clause, without consulting the
union. The Board held that both the insistence on the proposed
clause and the unilateral action violated section 8(a)(5). The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed that the unilateral
action was improper, but held that the employer could properly
insist on the proposed clause, approving the Trial Examiner's
view that this was simply a case of "hard bargaining" and his
assertion that "Economic strength is still the underlying touchstone of success at the bargaining table." The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the Board had erred (1) in its per
se approach, (2) in attempting to "sit in judgment upon the
substantive terms" of the agreement,38 and (3) in overlooking
the fact that under "the philosophy of collective bargaining as
worked out in the labor movement in the United States," 39 employers and unions frequently agree to "management prerogative"
clauses. Justices Minton, Black and Douglas dissented, agreeing
35 See the cases discussed by Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith,'' 71 HARv.
L. R.Ev. 1401 at 1423-1425 (1958).
36 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
37 Id. at 409.
38 Id. at 404.
39 Id. at 408. See note IO supra.
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with the Board that insistence on, as contrasted with a mere
proposal for, unilateral control over any statutory subject of
bargaining is tantamount to a refusal to bargain on that subject,
and a per se violation of the act.
To the extent that the American National Insurance Co.
holding is based on pre-Wagner Act practice, it is questionable.
Previously, the union had no legally enforceable right to insist
on anything; its sole resort was to economic force. The National
Labor Relations Act, imposing on the employer the legal duty
to bargain on "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment" changes the picture. The duty
to bargain includes the obligation to recognize the role of the
union as a joint participant in the establishment of employment
standards. By insisting on a management prerogative clause covering statutory subjects of bargaining the employer seeks to withhold such recognition. The employer may properly propose such
a clause, but it is difficult to see how the union may be forced
to accept the proposal and thereby surrender a statutory right,
as the price of an agreement. There is no real distinction between
an employer's refusal to agree to any standard to govern working
schedules, for example, and a refusal to consummate an agreement unless the union agrees to the removal of that subject from
the bargaining table. Pre-Wagner Act practice is not in point,
because under that practice the employer was legally free to take
either position. There is no basis for inferring that Congress
intended to prevent him from taking one position but not
the other.
The court's criticism of the Board's approach as an attempt
to pass judgment on the reasonableness of the employer's proposal
is likewise open to question. As the court viewed it, the Board
was attempting to require the employer to make a "concession,"
in disregard of the express language of section 8(d). This criticism would be valid if the employer had proposed a particular
standard for a work schedule, for example, which the Board condemned as unreasonable on the merits. In the case in question,
however, the employer had proposed that it have complete discretion on the subject, which means no standard at all. By its holding,
the Board was not requiring a "concession," but was simply requiring the employer to recognize the union's right to full joint participation with management in the establishment and promulgation
of standards of employment, which the court in the Heinz case
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had treated as an essential element in the collective bargaining
process.
In the White case, the employer insisted on a clause which,
taken together with other demands, amounted to a complete
reservation of control over all standards of employment. The
employer demanded a "no-strike" clause while refusing to agree
to an arbitration clause. In addition, the employer promised wage
increases in return for help in destroying the union, and, after
a protest strike, made promises and threats designed to break
the strike. This led to a Board finding that "at the time the
Respondent was meeting with the union it was also seeking to
destroy it." The Board concluded that the employer had violated
not only section 8(a)(l) but also 8(a)(5). The court of appeals,
with Judge Rives dissenting, disagreed as to the section 8(a)(5)
violation.
As the Board saw the facts, the employer had simply offered
a signed document with no substance. In its view, the proposed
contract would leave the employees worse off than without any
contract, since in the latter case, the employer could not unilaterally change the conditions of employment over which he sought
to reserve unilateral control. The court, however, was not impressed with the argument. In its opinion, the Board had simply
proceeded on the erroneous theory that the duty to bargain
requires the employer to concede something substantial, though
section 8(d) expressly provides the contrary, and had ignored the
American National Insurance Co. decision, under which the
extent of union participation in the establishment of standards
of employment is itself a "condition of employment" and therefore
a proper subject of collective bargaining.
The White case is distinguishable from American National
Insurance Co. in at least one respect. In the former case, the
Board found that the ·employer was attempting to destroy the
union. The court apparently agreed, but treated this fact as immaterial to the issue of refusal to bargain because the Board
had not linked its section 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(5) findings. At most,
however, this technical defeat warranted remand to the Board,
as the Supreme Court would probably hold. The more difficult
question is whether the Supreme Court would find it possible to
distinguish between insistence on a reservation of unilateral control over some subjects of bargaining, as in the American National
Insurance Co. case, and all or virtually all such subjects, as in the
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White case.30a If the court should adhere to its criterion of "the
philosophy of bargaining as worked out in the labor ·movement
in the United States," such a distinction would be questionable.
It would not be difficult to find many instances in pre-Wagner
Act practice of unions willing to settle, particularly in negotiations
for a first contract, for a skeleton agreement, perhaps one containing nothing but a recognition clause. But again, a practice
existing when no legal duty to bargain existed seems inapposite
under a law imposing a duty to bargain and setting forth certain
mandatory subjects of bargaining. The duty to bargain collectively
would seem to include the obligation to attempt to negotiate
the kind of agreement which would have a stabilizing effect on
industrial relations. A skeleton contract does not have that effect.
This is the principle on which the Board rejects such contracts
as a bar to an employees' petition to change bargaining representatives, 40 a doctrine which may be presumed to have the approval
of Congress. Applying that criterion, R. L. White v. NLRB 41 was
wrongly decided.
B. The Duty To Furnish Information-the Truitt Case42

Does good faith bargaining obligate either party to lend
affirmative assistance to the other in the bargaining process?
The Board has held, with the approval of the reviewing courts,
that "An employer's duty to bargain includes the obligation to
furnish the bargaining representative with sufficient information
to enable it to bargain intelligently, to understand and discuss
the issues raised by the employer in opposition to the union's
demands, and to administer a contract."43 The doctrine has been
applied to a number of wage matters such as merit increases, job
rates, job classifications and the operation of incentive systems.44
It appears to apply although the employer is otherwise making

39a Compare Cummer-Graham
40 "The Board has consistently

Co., 122 N.L.R.B. No. 134 (1959).
denied contract-bar effect to an agreement which does
not contain substantive terms and conditions of employment and thus does not stabilize
the labor-management relationship and encourage industrial peace." NLRB TWENTY·
SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 21 (1957).
41 (5th Cir. 1928) 255 F. (2d) 564.
42 Truitt Mfg. Co., llO N.L:R.B. 856 (1954), enf. den. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., (4th
Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 869, revd. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
43 See NLRB SEVENTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT 172 (1953).
44 See Cox, "The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith," 71 HARv. L. REv. 1401 at 14251428 (1958).
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a good faith effort to reach an agreement and has stated his
business reasons for declining the information.
A good deal may be said for the Board's doctrine in terms of
sound labor relations. One who plays his cards close to his chest
provokes suspicion as to his motive and invites reprisals. To
illustrate, a union having received complaints from its constituents
that the employer's system of merit increases has been arbitrarily
administered asks for information on which to assess the complaints. The employer refuses, on the ground that such information is confidential, but seeks to assure the union that the system
is being fairly administered. Thus rebuffed, the union may feel
it has no alternative but to demand the abolition of the system.
The employer may resist. The impasse may result in an unnecessary strike. The question remains, however, whether it is proper
for the Board to find the employer guilty of a refusal to bargain
if he should choose to assume this risk. 45
The general rule requiring the employer to furnish information concerning the subjects of bargaining does not depend on
how the matter becomes an issue. The rule is qualified, however,
when the information requested relates to the employer's financial
ability to grant a proposed wage increase. If he should raise tlie
issue by pleading inability to pay as the basis for denying the
increase, he must, according to the Board's Truitt doctrine, "substantiate his position by reasonable proof." The rule does not
apply, however, according to the Board's recent decision in Pine
Industrial Relations Committee, Inc./ 6 if the employer does not
plead inability to, pay as the basis for rejecting a wage proposal.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed with
the Board's description of its Truitt doctrine as "settled law." The
court reasoned that unlike ordinary wage data, the data which
the employer would be compelled to supply in a case like Truitt
would include confidential information, namely, dividends, manufacturing costs, and other "matters altogether in the province of
management." The Supreme Court appears to have rejected this
reasoning. In sustaining the Board's order, it stated: 47
45 Compare Cox, id. at 1428: "In virtually all the cases, except those involving
financial data, there could be no negotiation on the subject, in any sense of the term,
until the information was supplied to the union."
46 llB N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957), affd. Intl. Woodworkers v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1959) 43
L.R.R.M. 2462.
47 351 U.S. 149 at 152-153 (1956).
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"Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
made by either bargainer should be honest claims. This is
true about an asserted inability to pay an increase in wages.
If such an argument is important enough to present in the
give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require
some sort of proof of its accuracy."
The majority of the court questioned the Board's per se view,48
but pointed to no particular facts other than the refusal to furnish
the information requested which might have demonstrated bad
faith. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting with Justices Clark and
Harlan, was of the view that refusal to substantiate a claim of
inability to pay constitutes a "weighty item" of evidence of bad
faith, but felt that the case should have been remanded to the
Board to consider the totality of the employer's conduct, including
"the previous relations of the parties, antecedent events explaining behavior at the bargaining table, and the course of negotiations. "49 The statement by the majority of the Supreme Court
that good faith bargaining requires "honest claims" has considerable appeal, if the Board is to concern itself with bargaining
morals. Even in that case, the suggested rule would be difficult to
administer. Suppose an employer claims he can afford to pay only
three cents of the ten cents per hour increase demanded by the
union and furnishes financial information in an attempt to support his claim. The Board, on analyzing the information, concludes that he can clearly afford to pay ten cents, or something
more than three cents. Would the employer be subject to a
section 8(a)(5) charge? .Or, suppose a union demands a union
shop agreement on the ground that the employer is "anti-union,"
but refuses to substantiate its claim. Would the union be subject
to a section 8(b)(3) charge?
Ability to pay is an elastic principle. Its application in any
case involves some degree of subjective judgment. Its application
in a particular case may depend on the employer's business predictions and plans which he should not be required, as a matter of
law, to justify to the union. To illustrate the point, one need only

48 Id. at 153-154: "We do not hold •.• that in every case in which economic
inability is raised as an argument against increased •wages it automatically follows that
the employees are entitled ,to substantiating evidence. . • • The inquiry must always
-be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular case the statutory obligation
to ·bargain in good faith has been met."
49 Id. at 155.
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refer to the recurrent conflict between the Steelworkers and the
Basic Steel Industry as to the latter's ability to absorb the cost of
a wage increase without a price increase. The same conflict has
occurred between the government and the Steel and other industries in periods of economic controls, despite the existence of
official wage and price increase criteria. Again, in a case like Truitt,
the "honest claims" doctrine may actually discourage honest
claims and encourage dishonest ones. Faced with the alternative of
"opening the books" so that the union or a third party might
formulate a judgment as to the employer's financial position,
the employer may decide not to advance the claim of inability
to pay, taking refuge instead in other claims, or simply taking
an adamant position on wages, thus risking a strike. Or, rather
than risk a strike, he may decide to grant an increase which he is
convinced is not justified by the economic facts of the case, including his profit position, thus being forced indirectly to make a
concession on wages which he could not be forced to make
directly.
For the reasons suggested, refusal to furnish financial information to support a plea of inability to pay as the basis for denying a wage increase should not be regarded as a per se refusal to
bargain in good faith, or even as a "weighty item" of evidence
of bad faith. Its relevancy as well as its weight should depend
on all the circumstances of the particular case bearing on the
employer's state of mind.
Truitt was followed by Pine Industrial Relations Committee,
Inc., 50 in which the union requested members of an employer's
association to supply various items of information expressly in
order to "formulate constructive proposals for intelligent collective
bargaining." The data requested included figures showing annual
board foot production and related sales totals expressed in dollars.
Each employer refused to supply such information, claiming
that it would handicap him competitively. The Trial Examiner
found that the requested information was relevant and necessary
for the purpose of collective bargaining and should have been
supplied. The Board, interpreting the union's position as a request
for financial information to support a claim of ability to pay,
dismissed the complaint. In the Board's view, the Truitt doctrine
applies only when the employer has raised the issue of ability to
50

118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957). See note 45 supra.
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pay by pleading inability as the basis for refusing a wage increase,
whereas here the employers had expressly disclaimed such a plea.
Member Murdock dissented, on the ground that the data requested
related to "productivity" rather than to ability to pay. In his
view, productivity is a most appropriate criterion for wage increases, one repeatedly endorsed by the Administration; therefore,
the information should have been supplied.
In all likelihood, the Board will sooner or later be confronted
with a case in which the union demands a wage increase of an
employer on the ground that the productivity of his employees has
increased since the last previous negotiations; therefore, regardless
of the employer's profit position or ability to pay, the demand
should be granted. In such a case, would the Board require the
employer to furnish productivity information to the union at its
request? If the employer should deny that productivity has
-increased and on that basis refuse to grant a wage demand, presumably the Truitt doctrine would apply. But suppose he does
not make such a denial, or seek to justify his rejection of the
wage demand on that basis. Does Truitt control? Is there any
basis for distinguishing information relating to productivity and
information relating to ability to pay so as to require the employer
to provide productivity data in such a case, regardless of how
the issue is raised?
Several possible distinctions may be considered. Productivity
is a measure of the worth of the services of the work force, whereas
ability to pay is not. Productivity is regarded by employers and
unions alike as a relevant criterion in most cases, whereas ability
or inability to pay is emphasized by the party more likely to
benefit by its use as a criterion in a particular case. Productivity
information relates to unit labor costs, which can be determined
largely by objective standards, without disclosure of "confidential"
information, and without necessarily involving management in
a debate with the union as to the employer's business policies or
prospects. This does not mean that the furnishing of information
on unit labor costs will foreclose debate. There will often be disagreement as to what part of the decrease in such costs, if any,
is due to improved performance by the employees and what
part to management's efforts, how the resulting benefits should be
distributed among the employees, stockholders, and the public,
and so on. At the very least, however, the parties will have a
starting point for intelligent and constructive bargaining on the
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vital subject of wage increases, assuming such a consideration to
be relevant to the issue of good faith bargaining.
C. Union Refusal To Bargain-The Boone County Case51

The Board's statement in Pine Industrial Relations Committee,
Inc., that " ... our duty under the Act is to determine whether
the obligation of good faith bargaining has been met rather than
to establish ideal bargaining conditions" 52 is questionable in the
light of the foregoing discussion of cases involving charges of
employer refusal to bargain. It is open to further question in the
light of recent cases involving charges of union refusal to bargain.
In 1947, by adopting section 8(b)(3), Congress subjected unions
to a duty to bargain, stated and defined in the same terms as the
employer's duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5). The legislative
history of section 8(b)(3) discloses that .Congress was concerned
partly with what it believed to be the economic power of some
unions to force agreements on employers by a "take it or leave it"
attitude. The immediate cause for concern was the wave of postwar strikes by unions in the basic mass-producing industries.
Various proposals were considered to curb the economic power
of such unions, but in the end the right to strike was confirmed,
subject to a few specific restrictions.53
In Phelps-Dodge Copper Products Corp.,54 the employer was
charged with a violation of section 8(a)(5) by refusing to negotiate
with the union during a slowdown, which was designed to bring
pressure on the employer to accept the union's terms. A slowdown had previously been held to be a form of unprotected "concerted activity" under the act, 55 meaning that an employer who
disciplined employees for such conduct could not be charged with
51 Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enf. den. International Union,
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211.
52 Pine Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., 118 N.L,R.B. 1055 at 1061 (1957).
53 Section 13 of the amended NLRA provides: "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on
that right." Section 501(2) of the LMRA provides: "T'he term 'strike' includes any strike
or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason of the
expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted slowdown or other
concerted interruption of operations by employees." Section 8(b)(4) of the amended
NLRA prohibits certain types of secondary boycotts.
54 101 N.L.R.B. 360 (1952).
55 Section 7 of the NLRA protects the right of employees to engage in "concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection."
Section 8(a)(l) prohibits employer interference with such activities.
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an unfair labor practice. In Phelps-Dodge the Board, defining the
issue as "one of first impression," found the employer not in violation of section 8(a)(5) because of the absence of "fair dealing"
on the part of the union. In its view, the union had "engaged
in a harrassing tactic irreconcilable with the Act's requirement of
reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon which good-faith bargaining must rest." 56 In the
Personal Products case57 the Board, citing Phelps-Dodge, took
the next step of holding that similar unprotected "harrassing
tactics" for the same purpose not only suspended the employer's
duty to bargain, but constituted a violation of the union's affirmative duty to bargain under section 8(a)(3). The policy of collective
bargaining, the Board said, is
" ... neither furthered nor effectuated when an employer
or a union so exercises its bargaining powers as to thwart
or impair the bargaining process, which requires for its
furtherance cooperation in the give and take of personal
conferences, with a willingness to let ultimate decision follow
a fair opportunity for presentation of opposing views, arguments, and positions.... We think it clear that such unprotected harrassing tactics were an abuse of the Union's bargaining powers-'irreconcilable with the Act's requirement
of reasoned discussion in a background of balanced bargaining relations upon which good-faith bargaining must
rest'-which impaired the process of collective bargaining that
Congress intended not only to encourage but to protect." 58
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia refused to
enforce the Board's order. In its view, there is no inconsistency
"between genuine desire to come to an agreement and use of
economic pressure to get the kind of agreement one wants." 59
If a total strike for that purpose is permissible, so, in the court's
view, should be a partial strike. It is immaterial that the tactics
used might justify the employer in discharging the participants
on the ground that their activity was "unprotected" under section
7 of the act. Engaging in such activity is not equivalent to a refusal
to bargain.
56101 NL.R.B. 360 at 368 (1952). Emphasis added.
Workers Union of America, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 (1954), enforced in
part, set aside in part, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1955)
227 F. (2d) 409.
58108 NLR.B. 743 at 745-747 (1954).
59 Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 409 at 410.
57 Textile
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The Board's requirement of "reasoned discussion" as a factor
in good faith bargaining is, of course, not new. If, as the Board
found, the union failed even to specify the demands which it
sought to enforce by its tactics, the case could have been disposed
of on the basis of that simple requirement. But the finding was
relied on only as the basis for a "moreover" argument. The
Board's assertion, however, that good faith bargaining requires
a "background of balanced bargaining relations" and "fair
dealing," is difficult to reconcile with its more recent disclaimer
of any obligation to esta.blish "ideal" bargaining relations.60
If "balanced bargaining relations" suggests a duty on the part
of an employer or a union to exercise restraint in the use of its
superior economic strength to obtain a favorable settlement, the
Board has quite clearly added something to the basic philosophy
of the collective bargaining process. The Board's reliance on the
Heinz decision, which condemns a refusal to sign a written agreement on the ground that such conduct "impairs the bargaining
process," is questionable, for such conduct reflects an unwillingness
to permit the union to participate in the "final step" of confirming
agreed standards; moreover, the rule of the Heinz case has been
expressly approved by Congress. The Board's reliance on the
American National Insurance Co. decision of the Supreme Court
is also questionable, since the Board was reversed for the very
reason that it had undertaken, in the court's view, to evaluate
the conduct of the parties in the collective bargaining process.
Similar attempts on the part of the Board to require "fair
dealing" on the part of the union as a part of the collective
bargaining process have likewise been frowned upon by the courts.
In the Boone County Coal Corp. case, 61 the Board equated a
strike in breach of contract with "harrassing tactics," as a violation of the union's duty to bargain. In that case, the contract
contained a seniority clause and a provision for arbitration of
grievances. The union struck in a dispute over the application of
the seniority clause, an arbitrable issue. The Board found that
the agreement to arbitrate implied an agreement not to strike
over such an issue, from which it would follow that the strike
constituted a breach of contract. In the Board's view such a strike,
60 Pine Industrial Relations
61 Boone County Coal Corp.,

Committee, Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 (1957).
117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957), enf. den. International Union,
United Mine Workers of America v. NLRB, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 257 F. (2d) 211.
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occurring in a "bargaining context," constituted a violation of
section 8(b)(3). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
disagreed with the finding of an implied no-strike agreement.
This would have been sufficient to dispose of the case. A majority
of the court, however, felt impelled to query the Board's conception of the collective bargaining process, saying: 62
"The foregoing recital shows that a dispute arose between
the company and the employees, that negotiations were had,
largely at the instance of representatives of the employees,
that the negotiations resulted in a settlement of the dispute.
Stated thus nakedly, this would look like collective bargaining
at its best...."
IV.

SUBJECTS OF BARGAINING-THE BORG-WARNER CASE63

The opinions in the recent five-to-four decision of the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.
further illustrate the difficulties to be anticipated in departing
from the simple criterion of a sincere effort to reach an agreement resolving a labor dispute as the test of "good faith" bargaining. In that case, despite the fact he was acting in good faith
in all other respects, the employer was found to have violated
his duty to bargain by insisting on certain proposals as a condition
of agreement. One such proposal was a "recognition" clause
naming the local union as the bargaining representative, though
the international union had been certified. The second was a
clause requiring, in part, that all employees in the bargaining unit,
whether members of the union or not, vote by secret ballot on
the employer's last offer before the union could call a strike. These
proposals were part of a "package" settlement otherwise acceptable
to the union. The Board found that the employer's insistence
on either proposed clause to the point of impasse, by making its
acceptance a condition of any agreement, violated section 8(a)(5).
The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that insistence on
the first proposal violated section 8(a)(5) of the act since it conflicted directly with the duty to bargain with the representative
selected by the employees. The majority also reasoned that the

Id. at 214.
113 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1955), enforced in part (6th Cir. 1956) 236 F. (2d) 898, revd. in
part 356 U.S.C. 342 (1958).
62

63
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proposal did not relate to any of the "statutory" or "mandatory"
subjects of bargaining listed in section 9(a)-"rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment"therefore the employer could not press the proposal to the point
of impasse. On this latter reasoning, the majority of the court,
in an opinion by Justice Burton, held that insistence on the second
proposar was also a violation of section 8(a)(5). Justice Frankfurter, in one opinion, and Justice Harlan, in another, speaking
also for Justices Clark and Whittaker, dissented.
The majority opinion interprets the duty to bargain as
permitting either party to advance any proposal which is not
illegal or contrary to the policies of the act, but as prohibiting
the party making the proposal from (I) requiring that the other
party bargain thereon, or (2) making its acceptance a condition
of an agreement, if the proposal does not relate to one of the
"statutory" or "mandatory" subjects of bargaining, i.e., those
listed in section 9(a). An employer who insists on a proposal concerning a mere "permissive" or "voluntary" subject of bargaining
violates section 8(a)(3), because he thereby refuses to bargain on
the "mandatory" or "statutory" subjects even though, in fact,
agreement has been reached on all such latter subjects. A proposal
by an employer for a vote by all employees in the bargaining unit
falls in the former category, because (I) it settles no condition of
employment, but calls for a mere advisory opinion of the employees; (2) unlike the customary "no-strike" clause, the proposed clause prohibits strikes after as well as during the life of
the contract; (3) the proposed clause attempts to regulate the
procedure to be followed in rejecting a last offer or in calling a
strike, which is a matter to be decided solely between the union
and the employees it represents, and not the concern of the
employer; (4) the proposed clause undercuts the status of the
union as bargaining representative by enabling the employer to
deal directly with his employees.
Justice Frankfurter, remarking on "the rather vague scope
of the obligatory provisions of section 8(d)" would make the
distinction turn on whether a particular clause was "clearly
outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining." By this
test, he would uphold the clause proposed by the employer in
this case. He does not suggest an objective test to determine
"reasonable range." Presumably, he would leave the question to
the Board in the first instance, subject to judicial review.
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The dissenting opinion by Justice Harlan emphasizes the
following objections to the majority holding:
1. The no-strike clause proposed, no less than the usual nostrike clause, determines when employees may strike. Both types
of clauses are therefore "conditions of employment," hence both
are statutory subjects of bargaining.
2. By listing the subjects on which one must bargain, Congress
did not mean to preclude bargaining on other subjects. Assuming
that the proposed clause was not a statutory subject of bargaining,
that relieved the union of any obligation to bargain on it. But it
does not follow that by insisting on the proposal, the employer
violated its affirmative duty to bargain. Granted that the superior
economic power of the employer might, in practical effect, compel
the union to bargain, this is immaterial, since Congress never
intended the Board to "exercise its powers to aid a party . . .
which was in an economically disadvantageous position."
3. Congress regarded collective bargaining as a :flexible and
evolving process. New types of proposals are constantly being
made. The distinction between proposing and insisting on nonstatutory matters, besides being unrealistic, is difficult to observe.
Fear of overstepping the line and thereby inviting a charge of
refusal to bargain will inhibit the making of such proposals
altogether, thereby stultifying the bargaining process.
4. Insistence on some non-statutory proposals "might in the
context of a particular industry be so extreme as to constitute
some evidence of unwillingness to bargain." But this was not
such a proposal, since simil~r clauses had been negotiated between
several unions and companies.
5. The proposed clause does not tend to undercut the union's
status as bargaining agent. While Congress rejected a proposed
general requirement for a pre-strike vote on the employer's last
offer among all employees in a bargaining unit, it adopted such
a requirement as to "national emergency" disputes, and directed
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to attempt to
secure agreement on such a vote, in seeking to settle disputes
generally.
The Borg-Warner case was decided on May 5, 1958. Meanwhile, the Board, on' March 4, 1958, had decided Economy
Stores, Inc. 64 During negotiations, the employer proposed a clause
64120 N.L.R.B. No. 1 (1958).
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to indemnify it against damage caused by any future violation
of the proposed agreement. The union objected, but proceeded
to bargain on the demand, suggesting alternative clauses. Following an impasse, the union filed section 8(a)(5) charges. The General Counsel issued a complaint on the theory that the clause
demanded did not relate to a statutory subject of bargaining,
hence the employer had no right to insist on its proposal to the
point of an impasse. The Board dismissed this aspect of the
complaint. Members Rodgers and Jenkins found it unnecessary to
pass on the issue raised by the General Counsel, reasoning that
the union, by negotiating on the employer's proposal, had rendered the issue moot. If this reasoning is accepted, the danger
pointed out by Justice Harlan, dissenting in Borg-Warner, is
increased. Thus, in a Borg-Warner situation, one party will be
reluctant to propose a non-statutory subject for fear of a section
8(a)(5) or 8(b)(3) violation if it should press its proposal too far.
In an Economy Stores situation the other party will be reluctant
even to discuss such a proposal for fear of being held later to have
waived its right to object to the proposal as a condition of
agreement.
Chairman Leedom and Member Bean pursued a different
line of reasoning. In their view, since the Supreme Court decision
in American National Insurance Co., any demand advanced in
ordinary good faith may be pressed to the point of impasse. As
they saw the facts, the employer had made his proposal because
of repeated contract violations by sister locals operating in the
same community. Statements by the particular local that it had
"ways and means of getting things it wanted," could therefore
reasonably be interpreted as a threat by this local likewise to
dishonor any contract which was not to its liking. The employer
thus had a reasonable justification for his demands, which supplied
the basis for a finding of good faith.
The suggested test of reasonable justification, which would
permit a party to press even a non-statutory demand to the point
of impasse, would seem to conform to the basic principle of subjective good faith as the touchstone of the duty to bargain. However, on July 10, 1958, following the decision of the Supreme
Court in Borg-Warn'er, the Board issued its decision in North
Carolina Furniture,65 in which it reverted to its original per se
65121 NL.R.B. No. 8 (1958).
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view. In that case, the employer insisted on a clause which would
subject the assets of the international union to damages for breach
of contract by the local, the certified representative. The employer sought to justify his position on the ground that the
local had no assets and the international benefited from the
contract by the receipt of dues. The Board did not attempt to
appraise the asserted justification and held the employer in violation of section 8(a)(5), on the ground that the proposed clause
did not relate to a statutory subject of bargaining.
V.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this paper has been to review the policy-making
decisions of the National Labor Relations Board in seeking to
effectuate the duty "to bargain collectively" under the National
Labor Relations Act, in order to ascertain and appraise their
direction.
The Board's task has not been an enviable one. It has been
complicated by vague and sometimes contradictory directives
by Congress and the courts, by conflicting pressures from labor,
management and the general public, by numerous changes in the
Board's personnel, and by a drastic shift in congressional policy
reflected in the 1947 amendments to the act. Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that the Board has been able to maintain
any consistency in its own views.
The basic objective of Congress in adopting the act was to
promote industrial peace and to foster stable labor-management
relations through the process of collective bargaining. Congress
had in mind "the philosophy of collective bargaining as worked
out in the labor movement in the United States." 66 In laying
down the statutory framework, however, Congress departed from
that philosophy in important respects. 67 In some instances it
adopted rules inconsistent with its basic objective; in others,
rules inconsistent in themselves. Thus, while recognizing labormanagement cooperation as essential to stable and peaceful relations, Congress limited such cooperation by making it illegal
for employers to cooperate with unions by any means which
might tend to "encourage" union membership; 68 at the same
66 Note IO supra.
67 See p. 809 supra.
68

LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3), makes it an unfair
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time, it sanctioned agreements tending to require union membership, in order to remove a prime source of unrest in organized
plants. 69
Aside from such initial difficulties, the task of the Board has
been complicated by the process of judicial review which has
inevitably resulted in conflicts of decision among the courts
of appeals and divisions of opinion within the Supreme Court
itself, as to the meaning of the collective bargaining process
and the Board's function in relation thereto. The Board's task
has been further complicated by the pressures of labor and
management in particular cases, with little or no regard to
consistency or to long-range objectives. Finally, the Board has
been subjected to the vicissitudes of public opinion which seems
to demand a "hands off" policy and at the same time that the
government "do something" about union power and inflationary
wage settlements.70
In its early days, the Board conceived of its function in simple
terms, namely, to insure the establishment of collective bargaining. It likewise defined good faith bargaining in simple
terms. "The essential thing," it said, is "the serious intent to
adjust differences and to reach an acceptable common ground." 71
Soon, however, the Board began to concern itself with protecting
the collective bargaining process, and to condemn as a refusal
to bargain conduct which in its judgment "impaired" that
process. In applying this concept, it. condemned certain types of
conduct as illegal per se. More recently, this concept has been
held to require, according to Truitt, "honest claims"; according
to Phelps-Dodge, Personal Products, and Boone County Coal
Corp., "fair dealing" and "reasoned discussion in a background
of balanced bargaining relations"; either party failing to meet

labor practice for an employer "by discrimination in regard to ... any ... condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization. . . ." See
Radio Officers' Union, AFL v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954).
69 LMRA, §8(a)(3), 61 Stat.
70 Compare the following:

140-141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(a)(3).
"The committee bill is predicated upon our belief that
a fair and equitable labor policy can best be achieved by . . . free collective bargaining.
Government decisions should not be substituted for free agreement. . . ." [remarks of
Senator Taft, at 2, S. Rep. 105, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)]. "I say to my colleagues that
such action [a union's insistence on a considerable wage increase under threat of strike]
is not collective bargaining." [remarks of Senator Ellender, 93 CONG. REc. 4135 (1947)].
71 NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936).
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those standards is deemed to be guilty of an "abuse of . . .
bargaining powers. '' 72
The requirement of "reasoned discussion" is simply the
counterpart of the prohibition against a "take it or leave it"
attitude. What is troublesome is the broad requirement of
"honest claims" and "fair dealing" in a background of "balanced
bargaining relations." Does honesty mean subjective honesty, or
honesty according to the observance of reasonable standards, and
if the latter, by what test of "reasonable?" 73 In Truitt, the employer's claim of inability to pay was held to be dishonest, because he failed to produce supporting evidence, although there
was no finding that the claim did not represent his honest judgment. Again, what is the criterion for determining "fair dealing?" In Phelps-Dodge, Personal Products, and Boone County
Coal, the unions were held to have refused to bargain because
their tactics were deemed improper, although Congress had deliberately refrained from condemning such tactics as illegal.
Perhaps the most troublesome is the suggested requirement
of discussion in a background of "balanced bargaining relations." In the recent Buffalo Linen Supply case,74 the Supreme
Court applied a similar concept in finding that a lockout by members of an employer's association, as a counter-measure against a
strike against one of its members, was a privileged interference
with an otherwise protected concerted activity. In the court's
view, the Board could properly strike a balance ". . . between
the right to strike and the interest of small employers in
pursuing multi-employer bargaining as a means of bargaining
on an equal basis with a large union. . . ." 75 The court stated
that the "ultimate problem is the balancing of the conflicting
legitimate interests. The function of striking that balance to
effectuate national labor policy is often a difficult and delicate

72 Tex.tile Workers Union of America, CIO, 108 N.L.R.B. 743 at 746, enforced in
part, set aside in part (D.C. Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 409.
73 Compare Justice Frankfurter's suggestion in the Borg-Warner case, 356 U.S. 342
at 351 (1958), that any collective ·bargaining proposal may be pressed to an impasse if
it is not "so clearly outside the reasonable range of industrial bargaining as to establish
a refusal to bargain in good faith." As a long-time student of labor-management relations
Justice Frankfurter was apparently concerned with preserving the flexible character of
collective ,bargaining. Presumably he would have the Board develop and apply the test
of reasonableness, subject to judicial review.
74 NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local No. 449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
75 Id. at 96.
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responsibility, which Congress committed primarily to the . . .
Board, subject to limited judicial review." 76 In that case, however, the union was not charged with refusal to bargain for
exercising its superior economic strength against the struck employer. Is there a difference? Justice Harlan, who concurred in
Buffalo Linen Supply Co., evidently thought so, judging by his
dissent in Borg-Warner, involving a charge of employer refusal
to bargain. In that dissent, he stated: "If one thing is clear, it is
that the Board was not viewed by Congress as an agency which
should exercise its powers to aid a party to collective bargaining which was in an economically disadvantageous position." 77
The Board's reference to "balanced bargaining relations" in the
context of a refusal to bargain charge, if meant to contradict
this principle, is surely cause for concern. If a strong union is
guilty of a refusal to bargain because it has "abused its bargaining powers" in striking a weak employer for an "excessive"
wage increase, for example, then a strong employer must be
found likewise guilty, for the same reason, in saying "no" to
a weak union which has requested a "reasonable" wage increase.
Either result would clearly violate the fundamental principle
that "the Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel
concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive
terms of collective bargaining agreements." 78
The temptation to aid the weak against the strong is understandable. But in the complex field of labor-management disputes,
such questions as the tactics which may be used or the extent
to which a party may exercise its superior economic strength
to secure an advantage in the bargaining process, involve delicate
policy judgments. There is support in the language of the
Supreme Court opinions to justify the Board's exercising such a
judgment in seeking to "protect" the collective bargaining
process.79 There is even support in the legislative history for attempting to insure "balanced bargaining relations." 80
The immediate problem is not, however, one of authority but
the necessity or wisdom of its exercise. Perhaps the Board is aware
of the problem, judging by its recent statement that "our duty
76 Ibid.
77 356 U.S. 342 at 358 (1958).
78 American National Ins. Co.,
79 See the Heinz case, 311 U.S.
80 See note 70 supra.

343 U.S. 395 at 404 (1952).
514 (1941).
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under the Act is ... to determine whether the obligation of good
faith bargaining has been met rather than to establish ideal bargaining conditions." 81 The question is whether by this statement
the Board was merely defending the course on which it had embarked in Truitt, Phelps-Dodge, and Personal Products, or
announcing a return to its original ·concept of the duty to bargain
in good faith as simply "the serious intent to adjust differences
and to reach an acceptable common ground." 82

81 Pine
82

Industrial Relations Committee, Inc., ll8 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1957).
NLRB FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 84-86 (1936).

